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COMMENTS ON WAR PLAN CONFERENCE

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For the most part, the conclusions expressed at this conference duplicate those reached at previous conferences and in previous compilations of war plans. There may, however, be some profit in restating certain principles, obstacles, and limitations. These are as follows:

1. The support rendered to DD/P field elements by the DD/I will in a wartime situation have to be rendered at the overseas locations of the DD/P.

2. The DD/I has certain obligations, apart from its mission to support the DD/P, which will require a DD/I field activity in wartime. These include map procurement, FBIS, and support of joint-nation activities such as COCOM.

3. The DD/I--perhaps better the CIA field force, per se--will be called on to coordinate with facilities of the military services in a J-2 arrangement. This will relate particularly to U/W, political reporting, estimates, and strategic plans.

4. The DD/I ^{office} has ^{then} now gone about as far as it can go unless the following two events occur:

a. The CIA reaches understandings with the other IAC agencies wherein war plans--particularly as they relate to headquarters operations--are coordinated: e.g. the CIA geographers and the AMS work with and depend on each other--we do not know, however, the relocation site of AMS, its facilities, its potential demands on CIA, and we cannot informally be told these things.

b. The DD/P state specifically what it wants from the DD/I and under what conditions of pitch, urgency, and work magnitude.

5. The CIA has to face up to decisions in war plan matters, or stop spending time in such discussions as this one. The decisions relate to both pre-bomb preparations and post-bomb reactivation. Without them, war planning is mostly influential as a producer of cynicism in the middle management group. The present conference provided a useful point for re-check and updating, but was otherwise unnecessary.

6. A major effort should be made to set up a multi-agency CPI. If [redacted] failed to stir interest in the IAC, perhaps the IAC

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is really the wrong place to develop this relationship. The CIA will not operate independently in the next war; neither will the other intelligence agencies. If we want a meaningful practice alert, it must be one held as a group.

7. The agency should, through OIR, conduct the CD courses for key personnel as a requirement. If they are so important, special measures are appropriate to increase the chances of their survival.

8. I agree that the agency will not be crippled with only a small surviving cadre. It will, however, be crippled if it does not have strong leadership, is not composed of broadly effective intelligence officers, and has insufficient commo equipment to put into operation. Preparations for emergency should pay close attention to these things.

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